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Introduction 
The so-called ‘euro crisis’ is of the utmost 
economic, financial and political importance for 
all member countries of the euro area and for the 
future of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). In my view, however, it is not primarily a 
euro crisis in the strict sense. The euro itself is of 
course involved, but, as a currency with a rather 
stable exchange rate vis-à-vis other currencies 
and with a major role in global financial markets, 
it is not at the heart of the crisis. Rather the crisis 
is a matter of the serious imbalances in the 
economies of several euro-area countries, 
particularly their budget deficits and sovereign 
debts and as well as their lack of competitiveness 
and balance-of-payments deficits. 
This euro crisis has serious implications for the 
functioning of the entire European Union as well. 
The essence of the process of economic 
integration of the 27 EU member states lies in the 
internal market: one large and internally open 
market of goods, services, people and capital. The 
major advantages of the internal market can be 
further enhanced by the successful functioning of 
a single currency, initially in the euro area of the 
17 and, hopefully, later in the entire EU of the 27. 
Numerous financial and economic policies and 
policy instruments are now involved in a 
concerted  effort  to   get  the   euro   crisis   under 
 
control. Corporate taxation, however, is not a 
central element in these efforts. It is true that two 
large countries – Germany and France – have 
tried to create a link between the efforts to solve 
the crisis and the efforts to bring about some form 
of harmonisation of national corporate tax 
policies. But so far, their political manoeuvring 
has failed. For example, the proposal to introduce 
the common consolidated corporate tax base 
(CCCTB) in corporate taxation (discussed below) 
is  not intended to serve the EMU and the euro 
area as a policy instrument but rather, aims at 
improving the functioning of the internal market 
of the entire EU. 
Action in the area of corporate taxation is 
primarily focused on the functioning of the EU, 
that is, the internal market of all 27 member 
states, and not just the euro area of the 17. In 
other words, proposals for some form of 
harmonisation of elements of corporate taxation 
are of great relevance to all 27 EU members, 
including non-euro countries such as Poland. 
It is true that corporate taxation as such is not 
unrelated to developments in the euro area. This 
relationship is based on the fact that all elements 
of tax policy form part of the overall government 
revenues and the general fiscal-budgetary policy 
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The recent agreement among euro-area members 
to accept much stricter discipline of national 
budgets is of crucial significance to resolve the 
euro crisis. Member countries that are committed 
to reducing their excessive government deficits 
may consider taking measures in the area of 
corporate taxation by raising tax rates to increase 
overall government revenues. Such action may 
make sense, in particular, if the country’s 
corporate tax rates are substantially below the 
European average. (I refer to the case of Ireland, 
discussed below.) 
In a broader context of taxation, this point comes 
to the forefront in the conditions formulated by 
‘Brussels’ (and the IMF!) in the financial support 
packages destined for ailing Greece. Greece was – 
rightly in my view – requested to raise its 
unsustainably low overall tax revenues to reduce 
its unsustainably high budget deficit. These tax 
revenues include corporate taxes. What is typical 
in the Greek case, however, is that the emphasis is 
not, as in Ireland, on the tax rate being considered 
too low but on the collection in Greece of any kind 
of taxes. Its tax collection is unacceptably 
deficient and should be significantly improved. 
One should be aware, however, that national 
action on corporate taxation in the context of the 
euro crisis is not part of a European policy 
initiative towards any kind of tax harmonisation 
with the goal to improve the functioning of the 
internal market of the 27 member states. 
National differences in corporate tax 
rates 
Both inside Europe and globally, national regimes 
of corporate taxation show substantial 
differences. In the past, these differences could 
hardly be considered a surprise. In recent 
decades, however, with growing liberalisation of 
international trade and investment and the 
increasing globalisation of economic and financial 
activities, one would have expected more 
progress towards harmonisation, or at least 
approximation, in the area of corporate taxation. 
The differences present themselves in the national 
statutory corporate tax rates, in the corporate tax 
bases as well as in the effective tax rates.  
Perhaps one would expect that countries with 
high statutory tax rates would also impose high 
effective tax rates on corporations. In practice, 
this is indeed the case in several countries. 
However, in other countries, a much narrower tax 
base – a result of tax exemptions, tax subsidies, 
lavish deductibles such as depreciation 
allowances, etc. – offsets a higher rate and 
produces an approximately equal effective rate. 
Examples are manifold. The United States 
continues to charge a high statutory rate of 35% 
but offers a relatively low tax base, thanks to 
legislated exemptions or concessions yielded to 
active members of Congress or effective lobbyists. 
The net result is mixed, with an effective US rate 
that is relatively attractive for some US-based 
companies and relatively unattractive for others. 
Germany used to be a less competitive country 
from a corporate tax point of view, with high 
rates and a rather average tax base. During the 
last two decades, however, it has lowered its 
statutory rate and has probably become closer to 
the average as far as the effective rate is 
concerned. France continues to be on the high 
side for both the statutory and effective rate. On 
the other end of the spectrum is Ireland, which 
has stuck to its extremely low statutory rate of 
12.5% – introduced in the 1980s to make its 
underperforming economy more competitive and 
attractive. This factor has led to an exceptionally 
low effective tax rate (at least among the EU 
members before the enlargement of 2004). 
My own country, The Netherlands, is interesting 
in the sense that it used to apply a relatively high 
corporate tax rate of 48% with, however, a 
relatively low tax base and probably a close-to-
average effective rate. As Minister of Finance, I 
pushed through a substantial reduction of the 
statutory rate in 1988 from 48% to 35% (which 
was at that time considered very competitive 
internationally), with a simultaneous reduction in 
tax subsidies and exemptions for corporations, 
and consequently an increase in the Dutch tax 
base. My successors in the Ministry wisely 
continued this policy and reduced the statutory 
tax rate to its current level of 25%. This long-term 
process was accompanied by a combination of a 
rising tax base and a declining effective tax rate. 
I am still today an advocate of the same recipe for 
developed countries: a lower statutory corporate 
tax rate and a higher tax base. There are 
numerous advantages: more transparency, less 
complexity, lower perception of the cost of tax 
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and the tax departments of companies, fewer 
disputes and tax cases in the courts, less 
opportunity for tax evasion or fraud and finally, 
clearer comparison among various different 
countries of their level of the effective corporate 
tax burden. 
Consequently, I favour the adoption of a 
harmonised tax base in the EU, through a CCCTB 
(common consolidated corporate tax base), 
together with a trend towards a broadening (on 
average) of the current size of national tax bases 
combined with a degree of approximation and a 
further reduction (on average) in the current 
levels of national statutory tax rates in the EU. 
Harmonisation of the tax rate vs. the tax 
base 
As far as harmonisation of corporate taxation is 
concerned, not surprisingly, the focus of the 
political and academic debate in the EU is both on 
the statutory tax rate and the tax base. This 
debate received a serious foundation in 1992, 
with the report of the Committee of Independent 
Experts on Company Taxation, prepared at the 
request of the European Commission (‘Ruding 
Committee’). 
Since then, however, hardly any progress has 
been achieved, partly because of fundamental 
differences of views among the member countries 
and partly because of the requirement of 
unanimity on tax matters for EU decisions. 
Already at the time of the ‘Ruding-Committee’ 
report in 1992, I came to the conclusion that, on 
the one hand, a comprehensive and full 
harmonisation of the corporate tax in the entire 
EU was neither necessary for the goal of 
perfecting the internal market nor politically 
feasible but, on the other hand, a certain degree of 
coordination and approximation was needed to 
eliminate a number of serious differences in 
national tax legislation and practices in order to 
remove distorting obstacles to the proper 
functioning of the internal market. Probably the 
most unacceptable distortion was – and is – the 
double taxation of cross-border activities of 
companies active in several EU countries. 
Particularly egregious were the cases of 
companies paying higher corporate tax than 
competitors active in one country only. This leads 
to an uneven playing field and unfair competition 
within the EU. 
Although our remit in 1992 was to study 
primarily the corporate tax rates – and we 
submitted quite a number of valuable 
recommendations in this area – we also came to 
the recommendation that priority should be given 
to making progress on the highly complex matter 
of harmonisation of the widely varying national 
tax base in the EU countries. 
If and when the EU achieves a sufficient degree of 
harmonisation of the tax base – and this is still 
uncertain! – attention can and should shift to the 
corporate tax rate. This is not assured, however, 
as one could imagine a political decision towards 
harmonisation of the tax base without a political 
agreement to harmonise the tax rate. As far as the 
end game of this process in the EU is concerned, I 
would advocate some sort of middle-of-the-road 
outcome. On the one hand, there should be a 
reduction in the near full national sovereignty 
that now prevails in matters of corporate taxation, 
by replacing unanimity with qualified majority 
decisions and with a substantial narrowing of the 
wide differences in national tax rates. On the 
other hand, however, member states should be 
granted a certain degree of latitude to allow them 
to compete on the basis of the level of their 
corporate tax rate; or, in other words, to retain a 
moderate degree of national sovereignty in this 
domain.  
I continue to consider it difficult to reconcile a 
well-functioning internal market in the EU with 
exceptionally wide differences in the corporate 
tax rates. I am referring to Ireland’s decades-long 
rate of 12.5% and to even lower rates in several of 
the new member states in Central and Eastern 
Europe that joined in 2004. Such large differences 
may create serious distortions in competitiveness 
among companies and, therefore, in the 
functioning of the internal market. 
This may result in an EU framework along the 
lines of the ‘band proposal’ that was adopted for 
indirect taxes, in particular the VAT, during the 
1980s: a minimum rate and a maximum corporate 
tax rate, with a moderate although not 
insignificant width in-between for national 
freedom of manoeuvre and tax competition. 
Such an idea was hinted at in the Ruding report 
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towards relatively high corporate tax rates, along 
the preferences of high-rate countries such as 
Germany and France, with statutory rates at or 
above 40%. They indeed were trying to push 
upward the rates of other European countries 
with relatively low rates (30-35%), such as The 
Netherlands. My preference at the time was, 
however, different: not a push upwards but 
rather, approximation of the national statutory 
rates not far from the then prevailing EU average. 
In 1992, this would have implied a range between 
30-35% or perhaps between 30-40%. Today these 
numbers are different. In recent decades, several 
autonomous decisions by sovereign EU member 
states to reduce their national corporate tax rates 
changed the spectre of ‘old’ members; and the 
entrance of the ‘new’ members in 2004 added 
several countries with extremely low statutory 
rates (although not necessarily always the lowest 
effective corporate rates). So, if one would 
indicate an appropriate band today for corporate 
tax rates in the EU, one could think of 20-25%, or 
somewhat wider on both sides. This would 
assume, however, that several countries would 
combine lowering their tax rate with widening 
their tax base. 
Two final remarks on matters of rates. In many 
debates about the optimal policies for corporate 
taxation in Europe, the positions were presented 
as a black-and-white contradiction: one favours 
tax harmonisation in the EU or one favours tax 
competition between the member states. As I 
have outlined above, I do not see this as an 
either/or case. We should agree on a compromise 
outcome, with more harmonisation than today 
while retaining sufficient room for competition in 
the national rates. 
My second point is related to tax transparency. 
EU harmonisation of the corporate tax base will 
undoubtedly make it easier as well as more 
relevant to judge the relative attractiveness, or 
lack thereof, of the level of the statutory tax rate 
of a particular country. Nowadays, a lower 
statutory rate in A than in B does not always 
imply a lower effective rate in A than in B. After 
harmonisation of the tax base, it will be easier to 
determine that country X, with a lower corporate 
rate, is more attractive and more competitive, 
from a corporate tax-burden point of view, than 
country Y. This greater transparency may put 
pressure on Y to reduce its relatively high 
statutory rate in order to attract foreign 
investment. This argument of tax competition is 
welcomed by those who favour lower statutory 
corporate rates but is opposed by others who 
prefer to keep the prevailing higher rates. 
France and Germany 
As mentioned earlier, it is interesting to observe 
the political positions of France and Germany on 
this subject. These two countries have been 
constantly trying to achieve a degree of 
harmonisation of the corporate tax rate in the EU; 
particularly to accommodate their own interests. 
Traditionally they charged relatively high rates 
compared to most other EU countries. They 
advocated a sort of approximation, possibly by 
way of an agreement towards a ‘band’ (as 
explained above), with a maximum and a 
minimum rate to be observed by all EU countries. 
My problem with the French-German approach 
was that they advocated – in the early 1990s – an 
excessively high level for the minimum rate, that 
is, close to their own national rates which at that 
time were close to 40% and higher than most 
other members. Nothing has come out of that 
initiative.  
However, in 2010, in the midst of the sovereign 
debt crisis in the euro area, France and Germany 
re-launched their old idea. They tried to make use 
of the conditions to be imposed on the three 
countries – Greece, Portugal and Ireland – 
applying for financial support from other euro 
countries, by urging Ireland to accept a 
substantial increase in its very low (12.5%) rate. 
Ireland flatly refused such a condition. This 
proposal was not very convincing in the context 
of the Irish debt and deficit problem.  
Unlike Greece and Portugal, the root problem in 
Ireland is caused by, first, the outrageously 
irresponsible behaviour of the construction and 
real estate sectors of its economy and the 
eagerness of all Irish banks to indulge in a 
lending orgy to these sectors and, second, the 
decision by the Irish authorities to provide an 
unlimited government guarantee to all creditors 
of all banks in Ireland. This latter decision has 
ruined the Irish government’s finances, but the 
unsustainable budget situation was not primarily 
caused by the more traditional factors such as 
overspending and/or insufficient government 
(tax) revenues, like in Greece.  5 | H. ONNO RUDING 
 
Also, whereas France today still applies one of the 
highest corporate tax rates in the EU, Germany 
has made downward moves since the 1990s and 
is no longer in the same high-rate category as 
France. In 2011, these two countries, and 
particularly France, tried to renew their 
approximation proposal in the context of the 
general efforts to increase economic and fiscal 
coordination and common ‘governance’ in the 
euro area. This subject therefore deserves full 
attention in Central and East European member 
countries with low corporate tax rates, 
irrespective of whether they are inside the euro 
area or outside. 
Some observers had expected that France and 
Germany would try to include a reference in the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the EMU (the so-called ‘Fiscal Compact’), as 
approved at the European summit of 31 January 
2012, to an obligation on the part of deficit 
members in the euro area towards coordination 
of the corporate tax (that is, an increase in their 
corporate tax rate). In fact, however, the Treaty 
makes no specific reference to corporate taxation. 
Harmonisation of the tax base 
From the 1980s until today, the EU has made 
hardly any progress towards the harmonisation 
of the corporation tax, despite the 
recommendations in the Ruding report and 
several proposals submitted by the European 
Commission. After 2000, the Commission decided 
to concentrate its efforts on the tax base and to 
leave action on the tax rate for later. The 
Commissioners in charge of tax policies, first 
Mario Monti and then Frits Bolkestein, proposed 
several versions of harmonisation of the tax base 
by means of a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base. 
 
The most ambitious approach was to reach 
agreement on a Directive with a mandatory 
harmonisation through a CCCTB that would be 
binding on all companies active in one or more of 
the 27 member states. Subsequently, after this 
proved to be politically unacceptable to a number 
of countries, a ‘voluntary’ approach was 
launched, based on an optional system in which 
each company (better: group of companies) 
would decide whether it will – or will not – apply 
the rules of the CCCTB to all its activities in the 
EU. 
The alternative fallback position is the proposal to 
circumvent the requirement of unanimity and the 
recalcitrance of several countries, such as the UK 
and Ireland, by means of a limited number of 
members reaching an agreement to introduce, in 
a binding manner, CCCTB in this group of 
countries only. The Treaty of Lisbon explicitly 
permits such ‘enhanced cooperation’ provided a 
minimum of one-third (9 out of 27) of the 
members participate. This would lead to another 
case of a two-speed Europe, in a specific policy 
area. As in the case e.g. of the Schengen 
agreement, the justification lies in the preference 
for (geographically) limited progress towards 
integration above no progress at all, combined 
with the hope, or expectation, that other members 
will later join this initiative. 
After a period of passivity under European 
Commissioner László Kovács  (in charge of tax 
policies), the current Commissioner Algirdas 
Šemeta re-launched the debate in 2011 with a new 
draft Directive to introduce a CCCTB with the 
(above-mentioned) optional character. As may be 
expected, this proposal will not achieve the 
required unanimity in the EU. Then the European 
Commission and/or several supporting member 
states are expected to propose the (above-
mentioned) enhanced cooperation version for a 
more limited number of members. So, this is still 
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